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Microfinance in Rural China: Government Initiatives to
Encourage Participation by Foreign and Domestic Financial
Institutions

I. INTRODUCTION

An ancient Chinese proverb states: "give a man a fish and
you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a
lifetime."
In today's rapidly developing Chinese economy,
however, some people need more than a lesson in fishing to thrive.
One essential need is access to banking services In most
developing nations similar to China, access to banking services and
wealth go hand-in-hand.2 That is, people with access to banking
services live above the poverty line, whereas those without access
to banking services live below the poverty line.3 Studies have
shown that exposure to loans and secure banking services, such as
standard savings accounts, provide low-income individuals greater
opportunities for business and social development.4 Absent such
services, businesses never get started and families never reap the
benefits of interest-bearing accounts. Discrepancies in wealth
arise in developing countries in part because access to banking
services is a luxury that only a fraction of people in such countries
enjoys.'
In rural China, a disparity in wealth has arisen as banks
1. See generally Knowledge@wharton.com, Microfinance in China: Growth and
Struggle, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1471&specialid=
53 (2006) (last visited Nov. 18, 2007) (noting that a World Bank Report asserts "that
there [is] a strong link between weak access to credit and low incomes").
2. See Jameel Jaffer, Microfinance and the Mechanics of Solidarity Lending:
Improving Access to Credit Through Innovations in Contract Structure, 9 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 183, 183 (1999) (discussing, inter alia, how microfinance is a
feasible option for poverty alleviation by providing access to banking services in rural
communities).
3. See id. at 195-96.
4. See Aaron Jones, Note, Promotion of a Commercially-Viable Microfinance
Sector in Emerging Markets, 13 GEO. J. POVERTY LAW & POL'Y 187, 191 (2006).
5. See id.

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 12

have been quick to follow the population exodus from the
countryside to large cities. 6 Because Chinese banks have slowly
moved their resources from small, agricultural loans to more
profitable industrial loans found in China's metropolises rural
communities have not shared the same economic growth that the
rest of China has otherwise recently achieved.8 As a result, the
majority of China's 60 million impoverished citizens reside in rural
communities.9 The Chinese government and the international
community have recently taken notice of the wealth gap between
China's urban and rural populations, and have actively pursued
microfinance as a method to reduce poverty. '° Some policymakers
believe microfinance, a risk-reducing approach to provide lowincome communities financial services, is the solution to mitigate
poverty in rural China."
Part II of this Note will outline three common reasons why
banks perceive low-income borrowers as credit risks and tend to
avoid offering services to them.'2 Next, Part III of this Note will
provide a background on microfinance and will examine how
microfinance can lower the risks involved in offering low-income
individuals financial services. 3 Part IV will discuss the two
conflicting approaches to microfinance: one centered on poverty
alleviation and the other on profitability. 4 Part IV will argue that
microfinance institutions must be profit-driven rather than policydriven in order to meet the immense demand for financial services
around the world. Part V of this Note will discuss China's failure
to bridge the growing disparity in wealth and why microfinance
6. See Microfinance Gateway, Microfinancein China:Re-awakening the Dragon,
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/content/article/detail/28015 (last visited Nov. 18,
2007).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Global Envision, Poverty Alleviation Through Microfinance in China,
Feb. 6, 2003, http://globalenvision.org/index/php?fuseaction=library.viewdetails&cat
egory=4&itemid=140.
10. See Knowledge@wharton.com, supra note 1.
11. See id.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.
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could be used."5 Further, Part VI suggests that China's recent
concession to open its banking industry to the rest of the world
provides an excellent opportunity to encourage foreign banks to
initiate microfinance services in rural China.16 This Note will argue
that in order to meet China's large, unmet demand for
microfinance services, the Chinese government must establish a
sufficient credit information system and provide more flexibility in
interest rates to lure foreign investors into China's rural economic
market.17
II.

LENDING RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH LOW-INCOME BORROWERS

Researchers have demonstrated that there is a strong,
positive correlation between an individual's access to traditional
In many
banking services. and an individual's well-being. 8
developing countries, the absence of nationwide economic
development arises in part because a significant portion of the lowincome population lacks access to the benefits of banking
services.' 9 Banks traditionally have avoided offering services to
low-income borrowers because they have perceived the risks
This Note will
involved greater than the potential returns.2
specifically discuss three common risks associated with lending to
low-income borrowers in developing countries.
First, poor borrowers in developing countries are
commonly perceived as credit risks because banks are bereft of
Ideally,
reliable credit information to screen these borrowers.
lenders gather as much information about a potential borrower's
creditworthiness as possible. 22 The more information a lender
obtains about a potential borrower, the easier it is to make a more
15. See infra Part V.
16. See infra Part VI.
17. See id.
18. See Michael S. Barr, Microfinance and FinancialDevelopment, 26 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 271,275 (2004).
19. See Jones, supra note 4, at 189-91.
20. Id.
21. See Jaffer, supra note 2, at 188.
22. Id.
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accurate decision about whether to grant a loan and how to
profitably construct the terms of the loan if one is granted.23 In
developed countries, lenders are afforded the luxury of credit
histories, formal loan applications, and in-person interviews to
help predict the likelihood that a potential borrower might default
on a loan. 4 By contrast, most developing countries have
insufficient systems for collecting credit information, making credit
screening a difficult, inaccurate, and costly process. 8 Moreover,
interviewing a borrower in a developing country is usually not a
cost-effective option because many poor borrowers live in remote
locations and are not readily accessible in person or through the
use of technology. 26 Thus asymmetry in information regarding a
borrower's creditworthiness significantly inhibits a lender's ability
to anticipate the probability of success or failure for a particular
loan, making lending more uncertain for the lender.
For lenders serving poor borrowers in developing
countries, risks of defaulted loans are exacerbated because lenders
are not afforded the option of securing a loan with collateral in
lieu of credit history information.2 Especially in rural communities, low-income borrowers possess "very little capital, and even
the capital they have is not easily secured, because property rights
are not always well-defined or formalized, and legal recourse is
typically unreliable and costly. '29 Consequently, banks cannot
readily safeguard themselves against defaulted loans.30
Second, banks are further discouraged from serving lowincome customers in developing countries because transaction and
maintenance costs substantially reduce profitability on small
loans.3 ' Deficiencies in nationwide technology and infrastructure
23. Id.
24. Yoko Miyashita, Microfinance and Poverty Alleviation: Lessons from
Indonesia's Village Banking System, 10 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y 147, 150 (2000).
25. Id.
26. See Jaffer, supra note 2, at 188.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. Id. at 190.
30. Id.
31. See Kenneth Anderson, Microcredit: Fulfulling or Belying the Universalist
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cause transaction and maintenance costs to draw a greater
percentage of a bank's potential profit on a loan.32 Assuming
transaction and maintenance costs could be curbed, banks are also
disheartened by "the fact that it is inefficient for a commercial
lender to deal in such small amounts of money., 33 In developed
countries, the difference between transaction costs associated with
a $100 loan and a $5000 loan is insignificant.34 Everything else
being equal, the $5000 loan will be more profitable for the lender
than the $100 loan.35 Thus, assuming there is a market for large
loans, banks will avoid issuing small loans to low-income
borrowers.36

Since these perceived risks cause banks to avoid poor
communities, low-income borrowers, particularly in rural areas
where operating and establishing a bank is costly, turn to loan
sharks for money at financially-crippling interest rates.37 One
commentator states that "low-income borrowers can gain easy
access to credit but at high cost, charging poor borrowers nominal
monthly effective interest rates that typically range from about 10
percent to more than 100 percent-many times the monthly
effective rates of sustainable financial institutions, which are
usually 2-5 percent. 38 Consequently, low-income borrowers are
faced with the decision of whether to take out a loan at such a high
interest rate that they suffer financially from the loan's crippling
cost, or to avoid ever taking out a loan altogether. 39 Regardless of
the choice, low-income borrowers never grasp the opportunity to
escape poverty and the need for financial services in low-income
communities remains unmet.0
Morality of Globalizing Markets?, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 85, 99-100 (2002).
32. See id.
33. Id. at 100.
34. See id. at 99-100.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See Miyashita, supra note 24, at 153.
38.

MARGUERITE

S.

ROBINSON,

FINANCE FOR THE POOR 7 (2001).

39. See id. at 6.
40. See id.

MICROFINANCE

REVOLUTION:

SUSTAINABLE
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III. MICROFINANCE

A.

Basics of Microfinance

Because of the immense, unfulfilled need for banking
services in low-income communities, many policymakers have
turned to microfinance to satisfy this high demand. Microfinance
provides a way for banks and other financial institutions to extend
small loans (commonly referred to as microloans) and other
financially-related services to low-income entrepreneurs, while
limiting the risks associated with serving low-income customers.'
Risk-reducing microfinance strategies include:
superior information about borrowers to reduce
risks given low or nonexistent collateral; peer
lending circles to serve as pre-screening devices to
reduce information asymmetry; joint liability
contracts. among borrowers to enforce payment
despite weak legal institutions; short-term loan
contracts with regular repayments to substitute for
information; loan ladders that permit successful
borrowers to take out increasingly larger loans as
incentives for repayment; social networks and
shaming to increase repayment rates; and a variety
of other substitutes for information, collateral, and
legal enforcement to extend credit to low-income
borrowers without collateral assets.42
Increased profit margins captured by these strategies allow banks
to offer services previously unavailable to poor borrowers, 43 and

41. See Louise A. Howells, The Dimensions of Microenterprise:A Critique Look
at Microenterprise as a Tool to Alleviate Poverty, 9 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
COMMUNITY DEv. L. 161,164 (2000).
42. Barr, supra note 18, at 279.
43. See id.
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thus, spur business opportunities for low-income borrowers and
increase the overall degree of intermediation in an economy.44
B.

The Administration of Microfinance Institutions

The administration of microfinance services is commonly
achieved through microfinance institutions (MIFIs). 45 MFIs, which
number over 10,000 worldwide, serve approximately 150 million
people, and either governmental agencies, charitable nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or commercial banks
manage them.4 6 MFIs provide a variety of financially related
services to the "unbanked population,, 47 including legal assistance,
business consulting, and, in some cases, health insurance.4 8 The
crucial financial service for most MFIs, however, is the
apportionment of small loans known as microloans.49 Microloans
are taken out by small businesses (microenterprises), which usually
consist of less than five people and are commonly organized as a
sole proprietorship or a family business, 0 in an amount that
typically ranges from $500 to $5000." To offset the lending risks
associated with low-income borrowers, microloans possess interest
rates higher than market interest rates and shorter repayment
Upon receipt of microloans, borrowers must invest in
periods.5
business related investments such as office supplies rather than in
items of personal consumption. Integral to the success of issuing
microloans as a method to cultivate economic growth is the

44. See ROBINSON, supra note 38, at 7-9.
45. See R.H. Tipton III, Note, Microenterprisesand Microlending: The Missing
Piece in the Overall Tribal Economic Development Puzzle, 29 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
173, 177 (2004/2005).
46. PlaNet Finance, Microfinance, http://www.planetfinance.org/EN/microfinanc
e-entreprise/microfinance-presentation.php (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
47. Id.
4& See id.
49. See Tipton, supra note 45, at 180.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 180-81.
52. Id.

53. See Jaffer, supra note 2, at 198.
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assumption that "poor people can be both reliable borrowers and
avid entrepreneurs.""
C.

Benefits and Basics of Microfinance

Microfinance provides the bootstrap on which self-starting,
low-income borrowers can pull themselves up from poverty.5
With the assistance of MFIs, some low-income communities have
demonstrated that they can "make the transition from 'every-day
survival' to planning for the future. 5 6 MFIs around the world
have helped millions of people by distributing billions of dollars
worth of loans. 7 Bank Rakyat Indonesia, for instance, provided
$1.7 billion in microloans to approximately three million people,58
and 30 million low-income households obtained savings accounts
through the bank.59 As a result of access to these financial services,
borrowers from the Bank Rakyat Indonesia saw household
incomes grow by over twenty percent.6 One study across MFIs
worldwide found that those impoverished citizens with access to a
MFI were twelve times more likely to surpass the poverty line over
54. BUSINESSWEEK, Nobel Winner Yunus: Microcredit Missionary (Dec. 26,
2005), available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_52ib3965024.
htm; see also GAIL BUYSKE, BANKING ON SMALL BUSINESS: MICROFINANCE IN
CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA

16 (2007) (explaining that one reason why poor borrowers

have proven to be reliable borrowers is that they "have only one chance to prove
themselves. Particularly in new markets, where only one MFI is operating, a
potential borrower-who typically has never had a formal loan before-has a unique
opportunity to raise his or her living standards.").
55. See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Reflection in a Distant Mirror, Why the West Has
Misperceived the Grameen Bank's Vision of Microcredit, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 217, 23132 (2005); see also Muhammad Yunus, Towards Creating a Poverty-Free World, in
MICROFINANCE AND POVERTY: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES

26 (Farhad Hossain

and Zahidur Rahman eds., 2007) (stating that "[g]iving the poor access to credit
allows them an ability to immediately put into practice the skills they already know..
. And the cash earn is then a tool, a key that unlocks a host of other abilities, a key
to explore their own potential.").
56. Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.cgap.org/about/faq03.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
57. See Barr, supra note 18, at 274.
58. See Hassan Zaman, Microflnance in Bangladesh: Growth, Achievements, and

Lessons, in

SCALING UP POVERTY REDUCTION: CASE STUDIES IN MICROFINANCE

(2004), available at http://www.cgap.org/docs/CaseStudy-sca lingup.pdf.
59. See Barr, supra note 18, at 283.
60. See id.

47
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an eight-year span." Besides the financial benefits derived from
access to banking services, freedom from relying on governmental
assistance or outside charity also empowers low-income borrowers
and their communities.62 Beneficial social consequences from
microfinance, which have been particularly encouraging in women,
include a "positive impact on school attendance, increase[ed]
gender equality, reduc[ed] infant/child mortality, reduc[ed]
maternal mortality, and increase[ed] access to reproductive
health., 63 Proponents of microfinance do not suggest it is a cureall for alleviating poverty, 64 but they do point to its encouraging
track record of economic and social growth.65
IV.

POVERTY ALLEVIATION VERSUS SUSTAINABILITY

Providing financial services to communities that have been
unable to access these services in the past remains the general
purpose of microfinance today. Two conflicting views, however,
have emerged as to how MiFIs should concentrate their efforts and
66

resources. One view, mainly adopted by government and NG0
managed MFIs, argues that microfinance should focus principally
on poverty alleviation.67 The other view, adopted by comer-

61. The Global Development Research Center, Microfacts: Data Snapshots on
Microfinance, http://www.gdrc.org.icm/data/d-snapshot.html (last visited Nov. 17,
2007).
62. See id.
63. Isobel Coleman, Issue and Policy: Defending Microfinance, 29 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF.

181,185 (2005).

64. See Jones, supra note 4, at 194 (criticisms of microfinance include the
alienation of the poorest clients, a "mission drift" from poverty alleviation, and
corruption); see also David Hulme, Is Microdebt Good for Poor People? A Note on

the Dark Side of Microfinance (2000), reprinted in MICROFINANCE: EVOLUTION,
ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES 155-58 (Malcolm Harper ed., 2003) (arguing that
many MFIs fail to reach to poorest people).
65. See Miyashita, supra note 24, at 147-48.
66. In general, NGOs are "non profit entities whose members are citizens or
associations of a citizens of one or more countries and whose activities are
determined by the collective will of its members in response to the needs of the
members or one or more of the communities with which the NGO cooperates."
Celia R. Taylor, Microcredit as a Model. Critique of StateINGO Relations, 29
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 303, 306 (2002).
67. See ROBINSON, supra note 38, at 1.
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cialized MFIs, posits that MFIs should be profit-driven and that
achieving financial sustainability is the most effective way to
spread financial services to the greatest number of low-income
individuals.68
A.

The Goal of Poverty Alleviation

Arguably the most notable microfinance model focusing on
poverty alleviation is the solidarity lending approach pioneered by
Nobel Peace Prize winner Dr. Muhammad Yunus through his
work with the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh.69 Pivotal to the
success of the solidarity lending approach is the use of social collateral.7 ° In order to secure a loan, MFIs divide borrowers into
groups and require each group member to be responsible for the
entire debt of the group.71 In essence, a social contract is formed
whereby each group member functions as a third-party
beneficiary.72 Creditors benefit from this form of group lending
because peer pressure among group members creates an incentive
for each member to be accountable for the loan.73 As the group
and demonstrates reliability, the MFI
successfully repays its loans
74
limit.
credit
its
increases
The Grameen Bank currently provides loans to 7.39 million
people across Bangladesh. 5 While the Grameen Bank and MFIs
like it have achieved general success in mitigating poverty, these
MFIs have had difficulty generating enough capital to maintain
76
self-sustainable institutions. Professor Kenneth Anderson noted
68. Id.
69. See BUYSKE, supra note 54, at 11.
70. See Dyal-Chand, supra note 55, at 223-26.
71. See id. at 225.
72. See id.
73. See Taylor, supra note 66, at 321.
74. See Dyal-Chand, supra note 55, at 225.
75. Grameen, Grameen Bank, http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/index.htm (last
visited Dec. 29, 2007).
76. See Anderson, supra note 31, at 100-03. A sustainable MFI is "one that could
pay commercial cost for its funding without losing money." Robert Peck Christen et
al., Regulating Microfinance - the options (2000), reprinted in MICROFINANCE:
EVOLUTION, ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES 93 (2003).
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that MFIs focusing on poverty alleviation "very rarely succeed in
covering costs; self-sustainability is much more the extraordinary
exception than the rule for microcredit organizations."77 One
reason for this lack of success for institutions focusing on poverty
alleviation rather than profitability is that they offer below-market
interest rates.78 Below-market interest rates insufficiently cover
the high administrative costs of MFIs, which range from "10 to 25
percent of their portfolio[s]."' 7 9 Offering charitable interest rates
may beneficially drive down rates in the informal financial sector,
but the lack of capital generated by these loans makes MFIs
dependent on outside sources of capital. 8°
As a result,
governments and NGOs are saddled with the burden of nonperforming loans and have to constantly inject capital into these
unprofitable MFIs to save them from their financial demise.8 ' For
MFIs primarily focusing on poverty alleviation, microfinance
82
quickly becomes a subsidy program in disguise. Though these
unprofitable MFIs do benefit low-income communities, their
outreach can go only as far as their donor's budget permits.
B.

The Goal of Profitabilityand Sustainability

Microfinance, however, can alleviate poverty without
converting into a welfare program. For microfinance to meet the
growing need for banking services in low-income communities,
striving for profitability offers policymakers the most effective
method to alleviate poverty, while still expanding the outreach of
microfinance services."' Proponents of a profit-driven approach to
microfinance argue that the supply and demand for financial
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
See Miyashita, supra note 24, at 159.
See Christian, supra note 76, at 93.
See ROBINSON, supra note 38, at 95-97; see also TAZUL ISLAM, MICROCREDIT
AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION 65 (2007) (stating that the informal financial sector
"includes the multitude of transactions, which can be contracted informally on the
commodities market, the labour market, and the financial market").
81. See Miyashita, supra note 24, at 160.
82. See ROBINSON, supra note 38, at 95.
83. See id. at 7.

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 12

services in poor communities and the need to offset nonperforming loans should dictate the availability and costs of MFI
services. 84 Central to the belief that MFIs can achieve profitability
is that low-income borrowers are capable of repaying higher than
market interest rates with the appropriate assistance and terms
provided by the lender.85 Support for this belief has been
demonstrated in India, where several MFIs charged interest rates
as high as fifty percent and still retained a high repayment level
and positive social benefits. 6 The corollary effect of MFIs earning
a profit from microloans is that they can expand their services to a
larger portion of the low-income population. 87 BancoSol in Bolivia
is just one example of how cost-efficient MFIs can broaden their
services to a greater number of low-income individuals and still
alleviate poverty. 8 BancoSol now serves over 75,000 people and
even issues dividends to its shareholders. 89 Between 2002 and
2006, the amount of capital BancoSol distributed each year rose
from $80,917,000 to $164,155,000. 90 For a developing country like
China, embracing profitability as the goal for microfinance may be
the most effective way to alleviate poverty and increase intermediation within their nascent banking industry.
V. CHINA AND MICROFINANCE

A.

China'sNeed for Microfinance Despite Recent Economic
Success
Just focusing on China's overall economic growth over the

84. See HENRY R. JACKELEN AND ELISABETH RHYNE, TOWARDS A MORE
MARKET-ORIENTED APPROACH TO CREDIT SAVINGS FOR THE POOR (1991), reprinted
in MICROFINANCE: EVOLUTION, ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES, at 53 (Malcolm
Harper ed., 2003).
85. See id. at 87.
86. See Miyashita, supra note 24, at 159.
87. See ROBINSON, supra note 38, at 87.
88. See ACCION, http://www.accion.org/NETCOMMUNITY/Page.aspx?pid=66
6&srcid=493 (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
89. Id. In 1997, BancoSol became the first MFI to issue dividends. Id.
90. Id.
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past thirty years, 9 one would assume that it would have little need
for microfinance. Over this thirty-year span, it has emerged as an
economic juggernaut, becoming the world's second largest
economy, behind only the United States.92 China's gross domestic
product (GDP) grew at an average of roughly nine percent over
the last decade, thereby surpassing the majority of countries in the
world. 93

This upward trend seems to be continuing as China's

GDP grew over eleven percent in 2006. 94 During this period of
growth, China has slowly exchanged a planned economic
approach, which essentially allows the government to dictate the
economy,95 for a more market-oriented approach, which permits
market forces to control the economy. 96

China's transformation

has included: "the gradual liberalization of prices, fiscal
decentralization, increased autonomy for state enterprises, the
foundation of a diversified banking system, the development of
stock markets, the rapid growth of the non-state sector, and the
opening to foreign trade and investment." 97 Many commentators
believe that China's move toward a more market economy is the
impetus behind its newly-minted economic success. 98
Amid China's rapid economic growth and transformation,
some Chinese citizens have failed to reap the benefits of its newly
acquired wealth. 99

As China moves from the rice fields to

91. See infra notes 92-93.
92. See Randall Peerenboom, Symposium: Legal Implications of a Rising China:
The Fire-BreathingDragon and the Cute Cuddly Panda: The Implications of China's
Rise for Developing Countries, Human Rights, and Geopolitical Stability, 7 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 17, 17 (2006). This statistic is based on China's purchasing power parity of
$10.21 trillion in 2006. Central Intelligence Agency, World Fact Book, https://www.c
ia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html
(last visited Nov. 18,
2007).
93. See Microfinance Gateway, supra note 6.
94. See Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 92.
95. See id.

96. Berry Fong-Chung Hsu et al., Banking Liberalization and Restructuring in
Post-WTO China, 21 BANKING & FIN. L. REv. 23,24 (2005).
97. See Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 92; see also Lan Cao, The Cat
that Catches Mice. China's Challenges to the Dominant Privatization Model, 21
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 97, 110 (1995) (characterizing China's current economic approach
as "market socialism").
98. See Microfinance Gateway, supra note 6.
99. See Knowledge@wharton.com, supra note 1.
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skyscrapers, approximately 60 million citizens, the majority of
whom still reside in rural areas, live below the World Bank's
standard of poverty of less than $1 a day.'02 The average annual
income among urban citizens is $1000, whereas the average annual
income among rural citizens is only $100.10' A leading cause for
this disparity in wealth is that seventy-five percent of the rural
population lacks access to banking services.'02
B.

CurrentFinancialPolicy in Rural China

The few rural citizens fortunate enough to access banking
services obtain them from one of two governmental agencies: the
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and Rural Credit Cooperatives
0
(RCCs)1'
Out of China's four largest banks, the ABC is the only
one that significantly serves rural citizens.'0° It primarily provides
low-interest subsidization loans known as poverty alleviation
loans.105 Poverty alleviation loans have not been profitable for the
ABC and have been a major reason why it has accrued over $100
billion in debt.'0 6 Since the Chinese government announced its
plans for ABC to issue an initial public offering in the near future,
the bank has been slowly transferring its resources from smallscale, rural ventures into large-scale industrial ventures to gain
more profitability. 7 As the ABC continues to commercialize and
to shed its rural operations, an immense need for banking services

100. See id.
101. See ASIAMEDIA, China: Wealth Gap in China Becoming Dangerously Wide,
http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article-eastasia.asp?parentid=30168 (Sept. 22, 2005)
(last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
102. See Microfinance Gateway, supra note 6.
103. See The Microfinance Gateway, Rural Credit Cooperativesin China, http://w
ww.microfinancegateway.org/content/article/detail/28064 (last visited Nov. 18, 2007)
[hereinafter, Rural Credit].
104. See id; see also McCullough, infra note 126, at 423 (describing how China's
banking industry is dominated by the "Big Four").
105. See Rural Credit,supra note 103.
106. Phillip Lagerkranser, Agricultural Banks to Overhaul Rural Branches, Bad
Loans, BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 11, 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601080&sid=a6ZLm59jCFgO&refer=asia.
107. See id.
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is being left behind in rural communities.'O°
To help fill this void, the Chinese government has
appointed RCCs as the chief means of delivering financial services
to rural citizens.' 9 RCCs are a network of formal banking
institutions similar to credit unions that concentrate on supplying
rural communities with financial services."0 They were once a
subunit of the ABC, but after 1996, they became independent
institutions under the supervision of the PBC."' Since separating
from the ABC, the number of RCCs has grown to over 35,000, and
they now account for approximately eighty-five percent of China's
agricultural loans.'
Like the ABC, RCCs have not been
profitable in rural China"3 because caps on interest rates have
prohibited RCCs from compensating for the high operating costs
in rural communities.11 4 As non-performing loans have mounted,
RCCs have been forced to depend on the government subsidies." 5
By 2001, forty-four percent of the loans issued by RCCs were nonperforming and over a quarter of the RCC system was in such a
financial crisis that the government had to bail them out. 1 6 The
inadequacy of both the ABC and the RCC system has left many
Chinese policymakers calling for a more profit-driven approach." 7
108. See Microfinance Gateway, supra note 6.
109. See Rural Credit,supra note 103.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. Fred Gale & Robet Collender, New Directions in China's Agricultural
Lending, Jan. 2006, http://ers.usda.gov/publications/WRS0601/WRS0601.pdf.
113. See Knowledge@wharton.com, supra note 1.
114. See id.
115. See Gale & Collender, supra note 112.
116. See id.
117. See, e.g., Cao, supra note 97, at 177 (stating that "Chinese provinces have
become progressively less willing to expend precious funds to subsidize bankrupt
state firms. The growth of markets and mounting pressures posed by competition
have meant that government intervention through subsidies is no longer automatic.
For example, Chinese provinces must now compete with one another for acces to
domestic and foreign capital. Since expenditures for subsidies means that less money
will be available to finance profitable and invest-friendly ventures such as airports,
telecommunications, and other necessary infrastructure projects, subsidies as a
solution to inefficiency have progressively less appeal. The message to the state
enterprises is, of course, to look to the market and not to the government for
financial salvation.").
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China's Shift Toward Profitability

The Chinese government recently has expressed an interest
in adopting new microfinance initiatives."' In 2006, President Hu
Jintao recognized China's wealth disparity and claimed that as
China's economy continues to grow, it needs "to repay its debt to
the countryside."" 9 As part of the government's focus on
improving access to financial services in rural communities, the
government has initiated pilot programs to experiment with
different microfinance policies.
One such program experiments
with permitting foreign banks to fully serve rural Chinese
communities. 2 ' The experimental program's goal is to make rural
provinces more accessible for the commercial banking industry.22
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) recently
became the first foreign bank to launch microfinance services in
rural China 123 and other major banks are considering similar
paths.2 4 Just last quarter, Citibank, partnering with the Grameen
Bank for technical support, agreed to participate in the pilot
program and launch a rural branch.'25
D.

Foreign Banks in China

Foreign banks have not always been able to freely operate
branches in China. In the past, China's "Big Four"-the
Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China, the China
Construction Bank, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of
118. Knowledge@Wharton, Can Rural Finance Take Root in China? About 750
People Hope So, Aug. 29, 2007, http://www.knowledgeatwharton.com.cn/index.cfm?f
a=viewfeature&articleid=1699&languageid=l.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. REUTERS, Citibank, Grameen Join China'sRural Banking Pilot, Oct. 27, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNewsAndPR/idUSPEK689820071023.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See CHINACSR, Rural Banking Opens Opportunities for HBSC, Aug. 14,
2007, http://www.chinacsr.com/2007/08/14/1597-rural-banking-opens-opportunitiesfor
-hsbc.
125. See REUTERS, supra note 121.
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China-have dominated its banking sector.126 Now, the Chinese
banking system also consists of policy banks, joint stock
commercial banks, and urban and rural cooperatives to
compliment the Big Four.
These alternative banks offer
specialized banking services to target citizens in specific
geographical locations.127 Two Chinese regulatory entities hold the
Big Four and policy banks accountable: the People's Bank of
China (PBC) and the China Banking and Regulatory Commission
(CBRC). 2 8 The PBC mainly formulates monetary policy, whereas
the CBRC mainly supervises China's banking system. 9
Until recently, the PBC and CBRC have tightly monitored
China's banking system under a planned economic approach.3
Beginning in 2001, however, this trend changed because in
exchange for admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO),
China agreed to allow foreign banks unrestricted access to its
banking industry by December 2006."3 This included the removal
of "all 'non-prudential' restrictions on the banking sector,
including ownership and operation restrictions.", 112 For the first
time in history, foreign banks could establish extensive branch
networks within 13
China
and serve Chinese citizens directly in
3
renminbi.
Chinese
Shortly after the WTO agreement in 2001, major investors
saw equity investments as the safest approach to break into
126. Daniel L. McCullough, Note, Feeling the Stones: Measuring the Potential of
Deposit Insurance in China Through Comparative Analysis, 11 N.C. BANKING INST.
421, 423 (2007); see also Mitchell Silk & Richard Malish, Legal Implications of a
Rising China: Are Chinese Companies Taking Over the World?, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 105,
116 (2006) (noting that each member of China's "Big Four" is "a Fortune Global 500
company and each is ranked among the top fifty world banks").
127. See id.
128. Carol G. Liu, Note, New and Foreign Banking Markets: Scaling the Great
Wall: An Analysis of Foreign Banks' entry into China, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 397, 398
(2005).
129. See id.
130. See Rural Credit,supra note 103.
131. Karen Halverson, China's WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political
Implications,27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 319, 338 (2004).
132. Id. at 338.
133. The US-China Business Council, Foreign Investment in China, Apr. 2006,
http://www.usc hina.org/info/chops/2006/fdi.html. The renminbi is China's official
currency.
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China's banking system and into the rest of China's economy.' 3"
Across all industries in 2003 and 2004, China obtained $53.5 billion
3
and $60.6 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI), respectively. 1
To demonstrate the magnitude of China's FDI, India's FDI only
reached $4.3 billion and $5.3 billion respectively over the same
years. 3' Notable foreign banks like Citigroup, HSBC, Bank of
America, and Wachovia initially acquired equity interests in the
Big Four rather than opening branches and having to decipher the
PBC's and CBRC's complicated regulatory schemes.137 For
instance, in 2003, Citibank acquired more than a five percent
interest in the Shanghai Pudong Development Bank for $72
million with an option to increase its ownership stake to over
twenty-four percent.
Similarly, in 2005, Bank of America
acquired a nine-percent interest in the Construction Bank of
China.139 As 2006 approached and China gradually opened its
doors on account of the WTO agreement, foreign banks began
complimenting their equity investments with the establishment of
bank branches.'9 According to the CBRC, seventy-four foreign
banks had established branches in China as of the end of 2006.4
By creating branch networks and investing heavily in Chinese
banks, the major foreign banks are fighting for the best position to
tap China's $1.3 trillion in savings and 1.3 billion people. 42

134. See id.

135. Id. The United States Business Council website notes that China's Ministry
of Commerce stopped publishing the country's FDI in 2005. Id.
136. Rohit Sachdev, Note, Comparing the Legal Foundations of Foreign Direct
Investment in India and China:Law and the Rule of Law in the Indian Foreign Direct
Investment Context, 2006 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 167, 173-74 (2006).
137. See Rural Credit,supra note 103.
138. United States of America Department of Commerce, China, http://www.buyu
sa.gov/china/en/bank.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007).
139. The US-China Business Council, supra note 133.
140. See Du Xiaoshan, The Regulatory Environment for Microfinance in China,
Rural Development Institute, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Apr. 2005, http:
//microfinancegateway.com/content/article/detail/25978.
141. See Bei Hu, Bloomberg, Banks in China Compete for Staff, Raise Wages
(Update 2), May 11, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601089&sid=
a-lQ6oQbuXyI&refer=china.
142. See Jack Jirak, Note, Equity Investments in Chinese Banks, A Doorway into
China's Banking Sector, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 329, 329 (2006).
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VI. ENCOURAGING COMMERCIALIZATION OF MICROFINANCE
THROUGH POLICY INCENTIVES IN THE POST-WTO ACCESSION
AGREEMENT ERA

A.

Assets of CommercialBanks

Although it may seem antithetical to imagine major foreign
banks as a resource for poverty mitigation, they may actually
provide China the best opportunity to meet its 900 million-person
demand for financial services. Commercial banks possess distinct
advantages in their ability to "reach down" to low-income
communities and help the Chinese economy. 14 3 They have
established and streamlined management systems and, unlike the
Chinese government, 1" a history of expertise in market-driven
economies. Commercial banks also possess significant capital that
may be utilized without regard to overarching governmental
policies.
Despite China's gradual economic liberalization,
communist ideologies still bind domestic policy. 14 One reason for
China's $900 billion in non-performing loans is that Chinese banks
are still hindered by the government's social agenda.' 46
Consequently, government capital is inevitably susceptible to
redistribution on account of public concerns like natural disasters,
education, and national security. In contrast, foreign banks, free
from the strictures of public policy concerns, could provide such a
significant level of capital so as to liberate the Chinese government
from paying millions of dollars worth of subsidies each year in
rural China. A derived benefit of private funding is that the
Chinese government could reallocate more of its resources to
improve its financial infrastructure or to other pressing matters.
B.

Incentives to Encourage Business in Rural China
In order for the Chinese government to capitalize on the

143.
144.
145.
146.

See Jones, supra note 4, at 211.
See Silk & Malish, supra note 126, at 111-12.
See Gale & Collender, supra note 112.
See Silk & Malish, supira note 126, at 115-18.
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potential benefits commercial banks could provide, it must ensure
a greater prospect for profitability. To do so, the Chinese
government must furnish incentives for commercial banks to make
up for the reduction of profitability on account of the asymmetry
in credit information, deficiency in collateral, and high transaction
costs in rural China. 147 Two methods to lower these risks would be
to establish a comprehensive credit information system and to
148
permit commercial banks more leeway in setting interest rates.
To narrow the asymmetry of information between banks
and low-income borrowers, the Chinese government should
establish a uniform credit information system consisting of
comprehensive and updated information.19 A collective database
of pertinent borrower information would greatly benefit
commercial banks because it would reduce the risk of lending to
low-income borrowers without commercial banks having to
expend any capital. Several countries with profitable track records
in the microfinance industry have successfully implemented similar
public databases.5 For instance, the Mexican government created
a network of financial institutions that allows the institutions to
efficiently share credit information."' Crucial to the success of a
credit information network is for the government to provide
enough technology to readily disperse the information and to
provide comprehensive reports.
The more updated and
transparent the information system, the more efficient commercial
banks will be in using their resources in rural China.'52
In addition to creating an information infrastructure in
rural China, commercial banks must have more flexibility in

147. See Miyashita, supra note 24, at 150; see also Knowledge@wharton.com, supra
note 1 (stating that "the major bottleneck to the commercialization of microlending is
the lack of policies to encourage involvement by commercial financial institutions,
the failure to open the financial market to the private sector, artificially low interest
rates and the lack of a legal environment").
148. See Barr, supra note 18, at 288-90.
149. See Alexandra O'Rourke, Article, Public-Private Partnerships:The Key to
Sustainable Microfinance, 12 LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 179, 198 (2006).
150. Id.

151. See Jones, supra note 4, at 208.
152. See id.
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setting interest rates. As discussed above, interest rate caps have
stifled profitability and led to millions of non-performing loans.
Though the CBRC currently provides RCCs some leniency in
setting interest rates higher, the interest rates are still not set high
enough to generate a profit. 53 The CBRC must find the
equilibrium between cost-efficient interest rates and those rates
that will not ostracize potential low-income borrowers.5 4 Other
countries have implemented interest rate caps and have seen
similar losses in profits. After the government established a cap
on interest rates for MFIs in Nicaragua, the profitability of the
By
average MFI fell from 30 percent to just over one percent.'
contrast, banks in Indonesia have issued annual interest rates of
over fifty percent without reducing its outreach.'56 Even if MFIs
have to charge higher interest rates, the rates are still significantly
lower than alternative rates in the informal market.'57 Flexibility in
establishing interest rates forces competition among commercial
banks and informal lenders, which may lead lenders to lower
interest rates and create better products for low-income
communities.'58

153. See Gale & Collender, supra note 112.
154. See Knowledge@wharton.com, supra note 1.
155. See Amy Duval, The Impact of Interest Rate Ceiling on Microfinance, CGAP

Donor Brier, May 2004, http://microfinancegateway.org/files/2162853 (last visited
Nov. 18, 2007).
156. See Miyashita, supra note 24, at 159-60.

157. See O'Rourke, supra note 149, at 186 (noting that "in Bangladesh, the
commercial APR is between 10 and 13 percent, the MFI APR is approximately 20 to
35 percent, and the informal sources APR is approximately 180 to 240 percent....
[t]his example shows that while MFIs have to charge higher interest rates on average,
they are significantly preferable to rates charged in the informal market"); see also
ROBINSON, supra note 38, at 7 (stating that "[e]ven when real (inflation adjusted)
interest rates are used and borrowers transaction costs are included, it is normally far
less expensive to borrow from a commercial microfinance institution than from a
local moneylender").

158. See ROBINSON, supra note 38, at 7 (noting that "[c]ommercial microfinance
institutions can also offer much in-demand savings services that provide savers with
security, liquidity, and returns, a combination not generally available in the informal
sector").
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VII. CONCLUSION

Despite China's overall economic growth, a disparity in
wealth continues to widen.
China's current policy-driven
initiatives for offering low-income communities access to banking
services have done little to lift rural citizens from poverty. The
failing policies have also left the Chinese government with millions
of non-performing loans. 9 As foreign banks flock to China, the
government needs to seize the opportunity to channel the
resources that these banks possess into microfinance initiatives in
rural communities.' 6° To do so, the Chinese government must
reduce the costs and risks associated with doing business in rural
China. The Chinese government must entice commercial banks,
which are not known for their interest in serving low-income
communities, with the prospect for greater profits. 62 By building a
nation wide network of credit information and allowing flexibility
in interest rates, the Chinese government will not only modernize
its own banking system, but also bridge the financial gap between
its rurally impoverished and its nouveau riche urban population.
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